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Centralised punishment: punishment devolved to a legitimate authority.
Coercion: occurs when one player is forced into interacting with and
cooperating with an aggressive partner. Under coercion, the coerced individual
would do better to terminate the interaction but is somehow prevented from
doing so.
Negative pseudo-reciprocity: occurs when a cheating behaviour by one
individual allows the partner to perform a self-serving response, which harms
the cheating individual as a byproduct.
Negative reciprocity: see punishment.
Peer punishment: punishment carried out by other members of the social
group of a cheat.
Prisoner’s dilemma games: two-player games in which players have the option
to either cooperate or defect. In a one-shot game, players receive the highest
payoff from defecting, regardless of the behaviour of the partner. However,
mutual payoffs are highest when both players cooperate.
Public goods games (PGGs): players are endowed with an initial sum of
money, some or all of which they may contribute to the communal pot.
Contributions to the communal pot are increased by the experimenter and then
divided among all players in the game, regardless of who contributed. In these
games, the most profitable strategy is to withhold contributions and ‘free-ride’
on the investments of others.
Punishment: occurs when an individual reduces its own current payoffs to
harm a cheating partner. In doing so, the punisher reduces the payoffs to the
cheat and thereby promotes cooperative behaviour from the cheat in
subsequent interactions.
Sanctions: one form of negative pseudoreciprocity. Sanctions occur when two
or more players interact and one player cheats by withholding investment. The
cheated partner then performs a self-serving behaviour to terminate theHumans use punishment to promote cooperation in
laboratory experiments but evidence that punishment
plays a similar role in non-human animals is compara-
tively rare. In this article, we examine why this may be
the case by reviewing evidence from both laboratory
experiments on humans and ecologically relevant stud-
ies on non-human animals. Generally, punishment
appears to be most probable if players differ in strength
or strategic options. Although these conditions are com-
mon in nature, punishment (unlike other forms of ag-
gression) involves immediate payoff reductions to both
punisher and target, with net benefits to punishers
contingent on cheats behaving more cooperatively in
future interactions. In many cases, aggression yielding
immediate benefits may suffice to deter cheats and
might explain the relative scarcity of punishment in
nature.
Punishment in nature: unresolved issues
Individuals are often tempted to cheat in social interac-
tions, thereby gaining a benefit at the expense of coopera-
tive partners. To encourage partners to behave
cooperatively, individuals might therefore use control
mechanisms that render cooperative behaviour a more
profitable option than cheating for the partner. One such
mechanism is punishment (see Glossary) [1]. Several lab-
oratory studies have shown that punishment promotes
cooperation among humans, typically using stylised labo-
ratory games (e.g. [2–6]). By comparison, only a handful of
studies have shown that punishment promotes cooperation
among non-human animals [7–11]. This relative paucity of
evidence prompted arguments about why initial predic-
tions that punishment should be common [1] do not fit
current data [12,13].
Here, we critically assess empirical evidence for pun-
ishment in non-human species. We first outline how pun-
ishment can be distinguished from other forms of
aggression that promote cooperative behaviour, such as
coercion and sanctions, and then go on to discuss specific
empirical examples of punishment. We end by discussing
the conditions that are likely to favour punishment over
alternative control mechanisms and whether these condi-
tions are likely to be met in non-human species.
What is (and what is not) punishment?
Following the seminal paper by Clutton-Brock and Parker
[1], we assert that punishment occurs when an individual
reduces its own current payoffs to harm a cheating partner.Corresponding author: Raihani, N.J. (nicholaraihani@gmail.com).
288 0169-5347 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tree.201In doing so, the punisher reduces the payoffs of the cheat
and thereby promotes cooperative behaviour from the
cheat in subsequent interactions (Box 1). Thus, punish-
ment is equivalent to ‘negative reciprocity’ [1,14]. This
functional definition is useful for studying punishment
among non-human animals because punishment is not
contingent on a capacity for mental state attribution and
does not require the punisher to be aware of how its
behaviour might influence that of the target [1]. Punishers
need not always be involved in the initial interaction with
the cheat. For example, in ‘policing’ or ‘third party punish-
ment’, a bystander observes a cheat and is willing to reduce
its own current payoffs to reduce the payoff to the cheat. It
is still largely unclear how punishers benefit from third-
party punishment, however [14–18].
As with punishment, some other control mechanisms also
rely on responses to cheating that reduce the payoffs to
cheats. However, unlike punishment, such responses do
not necessarily reduce the current payoffs of the actor.
Instead, several responses to cheating described in the
literature are immediately self-serving and, hence, do not
relyonfuturebenefits arising from the increasedcooperative
behaviour of the target to be under positive selection. These
examples do not fit the negative reciprocity concept but areinteraction, which harms the cheating partner as a byproduct.
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Box 1. Payoffs associated with punishment and sanctions
Figure I shows categories of interactions among non-kin. The arrows
indicate the initial instigator and recipient and the + or  signs
represent fitness changes (as in [1]).
Punishment
In punishment (Figure Ia), one individual cheats a partner, thereby
increasing its immediate payoffs (++ relative to the payoff increase
associated with cooperating, +) and imposing a fitness cost, , on the
partner. The partner then retaliates with a behaviour that reduces its
immediate payoffs further, , which imposes a fitness cost on the
cheat. The fitness costs experienced by the cheat can be equal to ()
or greater than () the payoff losses to the punisher of executing the
punishment. In response to punishment, the cheat behaves more
cooperatively in subsequent interactions with the punisher. Note that
the cooperative interaction is mutually beneficial (in fitness terms) to
both players compared to outside options (not interacting) but that, in
the absence of punishment, the cheat could gain higher payoffs from
exploiting a cooperative partner. Also note that some effects are on
lifetime fitness (the effects of being cheated, of being punished and of
mutual cooperation), whereas others are on immediate payoffs (the
effects of cheating and of punishing). In interactions where coopera-
tive behaviour is binary, the cheating is simply the opposite of
cooperative behaviour. In interactions where cooperative behaviour
can be a continuous investment, then cheating can be defined as any
investment that is less than the population mean [55].
Sanctions
Sanctions (Figure Ib) occur when one individual cheats a partner,
thereby gaining a payoff increase relative to cooperating [56]. In
response, the partner performs a self-serving behaviour that imposes
costs on the cheat as a byproduct (2). This self-serving behaviour also
serves to end the interaction. Thus, sanctions fit the concept of negative
pseudo-reciprocity. We note that the term ‘sanction’ has also been used
differently in the literature (e.g. [57–59]). Under the concept of
sanctions, there is no future to the interaction. Classic examples
include the selective abortion by yucca trees of fruits that harbour too
many seed-eating larvae of its pollinator, the yucca moth [60]; and the
selective inhibition of nodule growth by leguminous plants in root parts
in which rhizobia partner bacteria fail to fix significant amounts of
nitrogen [61]. The permanent eviction of uncooperative individuals
from a territory or group also fits the sanctions concept. For example, in
coral-dwelling gobies (Paragobiodon xanthosomus; Figure II) domi-
nant individuals sometimes evict similar-sized subordinates, because
subordinates that grow too large can threaten the superior status of
their dominant neighbour [62]. Dominant gobies benefit from evicting
overgrown competitors without the need for subordinates to behave
more cooperatively (by reducing growth rate) in future. Indeed, evictees
rarely return to their group and there is therefore little or no potential for
them to cooperate more in response to eviction from dominants. Noe¨
[63] pointed out that sanctions often occur within a biological market in
which individuals choose the best partner out of a possible range.
Although the simple threat of terminating an interaction can be enough
to promote cooperative behaviour [64], the additional opportunity of
partner switching could enhance the effect [65–67]. Indeed, switching to
a different partner is an efficient way to select against cheating in
marine cleaning mutualisms [68].
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Figure I. Categories of interactions among non-kin. (a) punishment and (b) sanctions.
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Figure II. A coral-dwelling goby. Dominant gobies sanction subordinates that
breach a defined size threshold by evicting them from the group. Reproduced,
with permission, from Joao Paulo Krajewski.
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[19,20] (Box 1).
Coercion is another form of aggressive behaviour that
can induce cooperative behaviour in the target. However,
coercion differs from punishment because, from the point of
view of the target, no interaction yields a higher payoff
than interacting and cooperating with the aggressor. Thus,
coercion occurs when targets of aggressive behaviourwould do best to avoid interactions with the aggressor
but are somehow prevented from exercising this higher
paying outside option. Experiments on a coordination task
in keas (Nestor notabilis) provide a good example [21]. In
the experiment, one individual had to sit on a lever to lift a
lid covering a food tray, thereby allowing another individ-
ual to feed. Under these conditions, dominant birds aggres-
sively forced subordinate partners to sit on the lever289
Box 2. The evolution of punishment in n-player games
Experimental studies investigating the evolution of cooperation in n-
player games have typically used n-player prisoner’s dilemma (NPD)
payoffs, rendering contributions altruistic [69,70] and resulting in the
tragedy of the commons [71]. Evidence indicates that humans
willingly punish free-riders and that targets subsequently behave
more cooperatively [36–40]. However, in one-shot games, this raises a
second-order social dilemma as punishers invest in harming free-
riders although the resulting benefit (of increased cooperation) is
shared among punishers and non-punishers alike. Nevertheless,
because punishment often promotes cooperative behaviour in one-
shot games, evolutionary explanations for its emergence and stability
have been proposed. For example, several authors [14,72,73] have
suggested that punishment could spread through cultural group
selection. Here, social learning facilitates the local spread of punitive
behaviour, and demes with a high number of punishers outperform
demes without punishment. Arguments over the importance of
cultural group selection for the evolution of punishment have centred
on two issues. First, Gardner and West [15] and Lehmann et al. [16]
pointed out that, because punishment is altruistic in these models, it
relies on kin selection to spread in a population. Therefore, the logic
of inclusive fitness theory still applies. Second, cultural group
selection models struggle to explain how punishment becomes
established when it is initially rare [15–17]. Others have argued that
punishment in one-shot games occurs because humans evolved in a
social system in which repeated interactions are the norm and often
take place in a communication network [74]. Thus, humans are error-
prone when confronted with anonymous one-shot interactions
[18,75–78].
More generally, explanations for the evolution of punishment might
have been hindered by the use of inappropriate payoff matrices.
Specifically, punishment is efficient when it reduces a free-rider’s
payoff below the population average; at this point, the target does best
to contribute rather than free-ride. Further punishment is wasteful
because it reduces group gains without increasing contributions from
targets. Therefore, the net benefits of punishment are not a linear
function of contributions as assumed in the NPD framework but are
better described with a step function as assumed in the volunteer’s
dilemma game [79,80]; Figure I). In non-linear public goods games,
cooperators and punishers are expected to coexist in a stable mixed
equilibrium [81,82] and punishers can also invade when they are
initially rare.
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Figure I. Simple schematic of the costs and benefits of punishment according to
the investment in punishment under the volunteer’s dilemma framework.
Although the costs increase linearly with increasing investment in punishment,
the benefits (in terms of increased future cooperative behaviour from the
punished individual) follow a step function. Any investment below the threshold
yields no benefits, whereas further investment above the threshold yields no
additional benefits. Reproduced, with permission, from [80].
Review Trends in Ecology and Evolution May 2012, Vol. 27, No. 5without ever reciprocating. Forced copulations in animals
also fit the concept of coercion [22].
Mixed evidence that punishment promotes cooperation
The effect of punishment on cooperation has been best
studied in humans, typically using n-player public goods
games (PGGs) under controlled laboratory settings [2–
5,23]. Players can punish free-riders by paying a small
fee to impose a larger fine on the cheat. Although there is
still some debate surrounding the evolutionary scenarios
(Box 2), the majority of studies have shown that punish-
ment promotes cooperation in n-player games (reviewed in
[23–26]), although considerable cross-cultural differences
in the administration and effects of punishment exist
[27,28]. Punishment might be less successful in two-player
interactions. Dreber et al. [6] used iterated two-player
prisoner’s dilemma games with and without a punishment
option and found that, although punishment promoted
cooperative behaviour, punishers achieved lower payoffs
than did non-punishers. Instead, players that responded to
cheats with reciprocal defection achieved the highest pay-
offs. In this experiment, punishers were disadvantaged by
the relatively short time horizon of expected interactions
with the current partner. Interactions lasted between one
and nine rounds, which according to another recent exper-
imental study [5], is insufficient for punishers to recoup
their initial investment in harming a cheating partner.
In contrast to the large number of laboratory studies,
there have been relatively few real-world studies of punish-
ment and cooperation in humans. Notable exceptions have290focused on hunter-gatherer societies and typically describe
centralised punishment rather than peer punishment (see
Glossary) [29–32]. None of these studies have explicitly
examined whether punishment causes an increase in the
future cooperative behaviour of the target. Thus, these field
studies do not help to elucidate the precise conditions that
would favour punishment over alternative control mecha-
nisms, such as terminating the interaction with a cheating
partner, partner switching, or responding with reciprocal
cheating (but see [33] for a theoretical approach). Similarly,
very little work has addressed questions about the form that
punishment is likely to take in reality and about the relative
efficacy of different types of punishment. For example,
rather than monetary fines, punishment can also take the
form of physical aggression, verbal reprimands, negative
gossip statements or ostracism [29,34–36]. These different
types of punishment might impose variable costs on cheats
and differentially affect their propensity to cooperate. More
data on punishment in humans under real-world settings
are clearly a research priority.
In contrast to human laboratory studies, relatively few
studies have demonstrated experimentally that non-
human animals use punishment to promote cooperation.
Perhaps surprisingly, evidence for punishment in closely
related non-human primate species is scarce. For example,
although a capacity for vengeful behaviour has been dem-
onstrated under laboratory conditions in chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) [37], there is very little evidence that
individuals punish cheats under real-world settings
(e.g. for failure to reciprocate grooming or provide support,
Review Trends in Ecology and Evolution May 2012, Vol. 27, No. 5[38]). Moreover, in the laboratory study, vengeful behav-
iour in response to food theft by conspecifics decreased over
time at the same time that thefts increased [37]. This
further argues against the idea that vengeful behaviour
in chimpanzees functions as a form of punishment, at least
in this experimental context. Aggression from dominant
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) towards subordinates
that fail to advertise food patches vocally [39] also superfi-
cially resembles punishment. However, a plausible alter-
native explanation is that failure to claim possession of
food patches vocally results in resource-based conflict
among the monkeys [40]. In addition, there is no evidence
to suggest that dominant aggression increases the chances
that subordinates will advertise food patches in future;
indeed, aggression in this context might be fundamentally
unlikely to promote cooperative food-calling behaviour
(Box 3).
Solid evidence of punishment among non-human spe-
cies has come from work on the mutualism between blue-
streak cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) and their
reef-fish clients. Observations conducted under natural
conditions have shown that clients often aggressively
chase cleaners after jolting. Jolts are a correlate of mucus
feeding by cleaners, which constitutes cheating. Following
punishment, jolt rate subsequently declines [7]. Experi-
mentally preventing clients from punishing cleaners (by
anaesthetising them), showed that punishment causally
promotes cooperative behaviour from cleaner fish [7].Box 3. Learning processes and endocrine mechanisms of punish
Effective punishment requires some means by which aggressive
behaviour from punishers causes victims to behave more cooperatively
in future. A possible mechanism is operant conditioning, whereby
individuals learn to associate their behaviour with a particular outcome
[83]. If a particular behaviour is reliably followed by an aversive
consequence, the animal should learn not to perform the behaviour in
future. By contrast, aggression is unlikely to induce learning if it is
aimed at targets that failed to do something unless the range of
possible responses to the punishment is tightly constrained. For
example, consider the pay-to-stay hypothesis, according to which
helpers in cooperatively breeding societies contribute to cooperative
activities in return for being allowed to reside on the territory, and
breeders attack ‘lazy’ helpers (Figure I) [84]. Despite suggestive
evidence of punishment for failure to help (e.g. [85–87]), no study has
shown conclusively that aggression causes lazy helpers to increase
their contributions to cooperative activities. Under natural conditions,
the range of possible behaviours a lazy helper could be performing at
any given time is vast. A lazy helper is therefore highly unlikely to learn
to respond to breeder aggression by increasing its investment in
cooperation, rather than simply learning to avoid the attacker. Indeed,
in the absence of language to explain the rationale for punishment, it is
difficult to envisage how an individual that is punished for omissions
could learn to behave appropriately in future. This learning criterion
might also mean that punishment is unlikely to enforce cooperative
food-calling behaviour in rhesus macaques, where subordinates are
often attacked for failure to advertise food patches [52].
Rather than relying purely on learning processes, punishment
might also operate through endocrine mechanisms. Aggression
might often cause a stress response in the target [88]. If stress causes
more cooperative behaviour then aggression functions as punish-
ment. Few studies have addressed the link between stress and levels
of cooperation. In meerkats (Suricata suricatta), high levels of cortisol
in helpers are associated with elevated contributions to feeding the
pups of the dominant pair [89]. However, escalating aggression
typically leads to the temporary eviction of subordinate females fromClient aggression in response to cleaner cheating fits the
concept of punishment because the clients experience an
initial reduction in payoffs when they chase cheating
cleaners. Chasing is not necessary to terminate an inter-
action; some client species simply swim off instead [7]. The
investment in punishment is repaid if this cleaner subse-
quently provides a better cleaning service (i.e. more ecto-
parasite removal with less biting). Punishment also
promotes cooperation within mixed-sex pairs of cleaner
fish, with male–female pairs occasionally working together
to clean a joint client fish (Figure 1). During pairwise
inspections, the male and female cleaner fish face a prob-
lem akin to a prisoner’s dilemma because only one of the
pair can obtain the benefit of biting the client whereas the
cost (of client departure) will be experienced by both
cleaners, regardless of who cheated [41]. Despite the
apparent temptation to cheat before the partner does, pairs
of cleaner fish provide a better cleaning service than do
singletons [41]. The improved service quality is almost
entirely the result of increased cooperative behaviour by
females. Males aggressively punish females that cheat
during joint inspections of model clients and this incenti-
vises females to feed more against their preference in
subsequent inspections with that male [10]. Client aggres-
sion towards cheating cleaners and male aggression to-
wards cheating females fit the concept of punishment
rather than coercion. This is because, under natural cir-
cumstances, cleaners choose to interact with clients andment
group, resulting in stress-induced abortion [90]. Dominant aggression
therefore seems to be used primarily to suppress subordinate
reproduction, rather than to promote contributions to cooperative
activities. Cleaner wrasses behave more cooperatively after being
exposed to a stressor [91]. However, punishment by a client appears
to induce increased cooperation during the next interaction between
cleaner and punisher rather than a general increase in cooperative
behaviour towards all clients. It therefore remains to be seen whether
hormonal mechanisms could have sufficiently specific effects to serve
as the basis through which punishment induces cooperation.
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Figure I. Naked mole-rat queen and workers. Evidence that dominant breeders
use punishment to activate lazy workers in cooperatively breeding species is
currently scarce, and punishment may be fundamentally unlikely to evolve in this
context.
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Figure 1. A male–female cleaner fish pair working together to clean a joint client.
Male punishment in response to cheating females causes females to feed more
against their preference in subsequent interactions. Reproduced, with permission,
from Joao Paulo Krajewski.
Review Trends in Ecology and Evolution May 2012, Vol. 27, No. 5females choose to perform joint inspections of clients with
males, rather than inspecting clients alone. Thus, it can be
assumed that, in both cases, the punished individual
experiences higher payoffs from continuing the interaction
than from pursuing an outside option of not interacting
with the punisher, even if punishment imposes strategic
constraints on the behaviour of the target.
Punishment also occurs in interactions between sabre-
tooth blennies (Plagiotremus sp.) and their victims [9].
Blennies are parasitic fish that feed by opportunistically
sneaking up to victims and removing scales or mucus [42].
Recent work using a common victim species of the blennies,
the scalefin anthia (Pseudanthias squamipinnis), showed
that aggressive chasing of blennies by anthias reduces the
probability that the blenny will target anthias for its next
attack. Thus, in this case, punishment by individual
anthias creates a public good for the shoal because the
blenny is then less likely to attack the punisher and the
punisher’s shoal members. Nevertheless, punishment in
this case may still benefit the individual punisher. Experi-
mental work with model targets in the lab demonstrated
that blennies can distinguish between punishers and look-
alike non-punishers, and avoid biting targets that punish.292To sum up, good evidence from controlled laboratory
studies exists to show that humans use punishment to
promote cooperation. Similar real-world studies in humans
are relatively scarce, however. In non-human animals,
studies on just a handful of species have been able to
demonstrate that individuals invest to harm cheating
partners. The studies in non-human animals that do dem-
onstrate punishment have all done so under ecologically
valid conditions.
The evolution of punishment in nature
By comparing empirical results from studies on humans
and other species, it is possible to generate predictions
about the game theoretic conditions that are likely to
favour the evolution of punishment in nature. In turn,
we argue that it is crucial to consider the following attri-
butes of an interaction to predict whether punishment is
likely to evolve as a cooperation-enforcing mechanism: (i)
player number and asymmetries; (ii) time horizons for
interactions; (iii) whether punished individuals are likely
to learn the association between cheating and receiving
aggression; and (iv) whether cheating is a continuous or a
discrete event.
Player number and asymmetries
Punishment might generally be more likely to occur in
symmetric n-player games than in symmetric two-player
games. In two-player games where players have equal
strength and strategic options, reciprocal defection might
be a cheaper way to control cheating partners than pun-
ishment because the latter reduces current payoffs and
may precipitate counter-punishment (e.g. [6]). The threat
of retaliation increases the costs associated with punish-
ment beyond the initial investment in harming a cheating
partner. Reciprocal defection is less effective in n-player
games, however, because defection harms cooperative
partners as well as cheats. Thus, punishment directed at
cheats might be more effective at promoting cooperation
and, therefore, more likely to evolve, in n-player interac-
tions. Nevertheless, punishment might be relatively com-
mon in two-player games where there are substantial
asymmetries between players, such as differences in
strength or strategic options. Differences in strength re-
duce the chance that punished individuals will retaliate
rather than cooperate and, therefore, reduce the costs
associated with punishment (e.g. [6,10]). As initially point-
ed out [1], punishment might be most likely to evolve under
this ‘common-sense’ scenario: dominants are most often
expected to punish subordinates that, in turn, are unlikely
to retaliate. Asymmetries in player strength are expected
to be a common feature of real-world interactions. Real-
world studies of humans have shown that punishment is
often administered by a central authority [30,43,44]. The
inherent power asymmetry in such interactions might
decrease the chances that punished individuals will retali-
ate against punishers. Where punishment is not institu-
tionalised and is instead effected by the peers of the
cheating individual (e.g. [29,31]), punishment might only
occur if sufficient peers agree to participate in the punish-
ing behaviour. For example, warriors of the pastoralist
Turkana society from East Africa, often mete out corporal
Review Trends in Ecology and Evolution May 2012, Vol. 27, No. 5punishment to free-riders, that is, individuals that
defect during raids on other societies. Punishment is only
administered once a critical number of warriors are assem-
bled to admonish the cheat [31]. This strength in numbers
can create an asymmetry between punishing and punished
individuals, and reduce the possibility that punished
individuals will retaliate against their aggressors. As well
as asymmetries in strength, it might often be the case
that players have asymmetric strategy sets, for example
where only one class of player can cheat whereas the
partner cannot. For example, cleaner fish can cheat non-
predatory clients by biting them but these clients cannot
cheat in return. Where one class of player cannot use
reciprocal defection to control cheating partners, they might
instead use punishment to induce cooperative behaviour
(e.g. [8,10]).
Time horizons for interactions
The number of rounds in which the punisher and punished
individuals expect to interact will influence the net benefit
associated with investing in punishment. Short time hor-
izons mean that there are fewer opportunities for the
punisher to benefit from changes in the behaviour of the
punished individual; whereas the net benefit of investing
in punishment might be higher in more stable relation-
ships (e.g. [5]). Indeed, peer-punishment in humans is
thought to have evolved in small, stable groups, where
punishers might have expected to interact with punished
individuals again in the future. In larger groups with
infrequent interactions, decentralised peer-punishment
is expected to be less common and punishment responsi-
bilities are instead devolved to centralised authorities [43].
The outside options available to interaction partners
can affect the time horizons of interactions. Individuals
pursue outside options when they leave, evict or eliminate
a current partner rather than continuing with the current
interaction [45]. Exercising outside options therefore nec-
essarily shortens the time horizon of interactions. If indi-
viduals derive greater payoffs from exercising outside
options rather than administering punishment or coop-
erating in response to punishment, respectively, then pun-
ishment is unlikely to evolve as a cooperation-enforcing
mechanism. In many cases, individuals exercise outside
options by terminating a current interaction with a cheat-
ing partner and instead seeking interactions with alterna-
tive partners. The payoffs of exercising partner choice,
rather than punishment, to control interaction partners
is likely to depend on the costs associated with finding a
new partner and on population-level variance in coopera-
tive tendency. Specifically, partner choice might be rela-
tively common where the opportunity or energetic costs
associated with finding a new partner are sufficiently low
and also if there is sufficient population-level variation in
partner cooperativeness such that new partners are likely
to be more cooperative than the current (cheating) partner
[46]. Field data on L. dimidiatus support the idea that
outside options influence the time horizon of interactions
and thereby affect the efficacy of punishment as a cooper-
ation-enforcing mechanism. Only individuals of species
that are forced to interact repeatedly with a specific cleaner
fish (owing to small home range sizes) punish cheatingcleaners, whereas clients with access to several cleaners
(outside options) simply choose another cleaner fish if they
receive a poor service. Conversely, the closely related
cleaner wrasse Labroides bicolor, which roves over large
areas [47], behaves more cooperatively in areas it visits
frequently than in areas it rarely visits, as predicted by the
‘shadow of the future’ concept [48].
Punishment might often require associative learning
The relative paucity of data fitting the concept of punish-
ment in non-humans might partly stem from cognitive
constraints. Punishment requires that the punished indi-
vidual associates its cheating behaviour with a negative
response from the partner, and so learns to avoid repeating
that behaviour again in subsequent interactions. It is
currently unclear how such learning mechanisms might
operate and whether different contexts might favour or
preclude learning to cooperate in response to being pun-
ished (Box 3). This learning requirement can help
researchers to predict more accurately the circumstances
that are likely to favour punishment in nature. Animals
are most likely to form associations between their own
behaviour and the punitive responses of a partner when
the punishment occurs very shortly after their own cheat-
ing behaviour. Long time delays between cheating behav-
iour and punishment are not conducive to associative
learning [49,50]. Furthermore, individuals might be more
likely to learn to stop performing a cheating behaviour
than to learn to start performing a beneficial behaviour in
response to being punished (Box 3).
It is also worth considering the cognitive mechanisms
that might favour investment in punishment. Punishers
might be relatively unlikely to learn a positive association
between punishment and increased payoffs because pun-
ishment involves an immediate payoff reduction to punish-
ers, compared with not punishing a cheat [12]. Instead,
punishment might rely on fixed responses to cheats, on the
capacity to predict that aggression will cause targets to
behave more cooperatively, or on evolved subjective reward
mechanisms (as in humans, where punishment activates
areas associated with processing rewards in the brain [51]).
In situations where individuals interact with several part-
ners in different contexts, it could also be cognitively
demanding for would-be punishers to keep track of who
does what and when. This in turn might limit the capacity
for punishment, in much the same way that it has been
argued that similar cognitive burdens might inhibit the
evolution of cooperation by positive reciprocity [52].
Cheating: discrete or continuous?
Punishment will be most likely to occur where cheating is a
discrete event, rather than a continuous behaviour where
the magnitude of inflicted costs is a function of interaction
duration. For example, Turkana warriors sometimes des-
ert their fellow fighters during a raid. This is a discrete
cheating behaviour that often results in punishment [31].
Where cheating is a continuous behaviour, individuals can
control cheating partners using aggression resulting in
immediate benefits. This violates a key feature of the
definition of punishment that posits an immediate payoff
reduction and delayed benefits that are contingent on the293
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seal (Mirounga leonina) pups that are caught suckling
from a female other than their mother risk being attacked
by this female, sometimes fatally [53]. Although such
attacks might serve to deter pups from suckling from that
female in the future, the female in question immediately
benefits when she prevents a foreign pup from draining
her milk resources. Thus, this does not fit the concept of
punishment. By contrast, a cleaner fish that bites a client
performs a discrete event that causes harm to the client.
Clients are aggressive after the bite has occurred, meaning
that aggression does not produce immediate benefits by
stopping the cleaner fish from continuing to bite. Rather,
the benefits of client aggression are conditional and depend
on the future cooperative behaviour of the cleaner fish in
question. Considering the difference between aggression
that provides immediate benefits and aggression where
the benefits are delayed (punishment) is not trivial. In
the former situation, the benefits to the aggressor are
assured as it performs the aggressive behaviour, whereas
in the latter situation, the benefits are contingent on future
interactions with the cheating partner (see [54] for a discus-
sion of assured versus conditional benefits of investment).
Concluding remarks
Punishment is most likely to evolve in response to free-
riding in symmetric n-player public goods games or in
asymmetric two-player interactions. Although asymmetric
two-player games and n-player public goods games are
relatively common in nature, punishment has only rarely
been documented in non-human species. This is in stark
contrast to human behaviour in laboratory experiments.
The scarcity of punishment among non-human animals
might stem in part from cognitive constraints on what can
be learned in response to aggression in the absence of
language. Furthermore, it might often be the case that
aggression against cheating partners yields immediate
benefits, whereas immediate payoff reduction (and hence
punishment) is only expected if the aggression follows
discrete cheating events. In humans, laboratory games
have all assumed that cheating is a discrete event, which
could explain why games using human subjects report
relatively high levels of punishment. Further ‘field’ data
on human punishment would allow the assessment of
whether cheating is often discrete or continuous and
how commonly punishment is used to promote cooperation,
compared to other mechanisms of interest. Finally, we note
that there might be several examples where an aggressive
act in response to a cheat appears to yield both immediate
benefits to the aggressor (by stopping the cheat from
performing a harmful behaviour) and future benefits (by
making it less probable that the target will cheat in future
interactions with the aggressor). Such interactions do not
fit either our definition of punishment or of sanctions. We
also note that, in some cases, an aggressive act could not
only immediately benefit the actor, but also result in
future, population-level benefits by causing the target to
behave more cooperatively with future interaction part-
ners. Thus, under our current definition, sanctioning be-
haviour could theoretically provide population-level public
goods in the same way that punishment can [9].294Acknowledgements
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